Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 7 | Issue 1

1974

Book Review
Lawrence

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lawrence, Book Review, 7 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 140 (1974)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol7/iss1/7

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western
Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

[Vol. 7: 140

BOOK REVIEW
THE NOMINALISTIC

PRINCIPLE:

A

LEGAL APPROACH TO INFLA-

TION, DEFLATION, DEVALUATION, AND REVALUATION. By Eliyahu
Hirschberg. Ramat-gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University (1971). Pp. 138.

In light of the current world-wide inflation and the successive
devaluations and revaluations of the currencies of the world, The
Nominalistic Principle presents a timely theoretical analysis of
changes in the value of money and their impact on the private sector. The Nominalistic Principle is not a dissertation on international monetary or fiscal policy, nor is it a study of comparative economic systems; rather, Eliyahu Hirschberg presents a legal study of
common principles which govern changes in the value of money
and how these principles effect private legal rights and obligations.
To achieve perspective for analyzing The Nominalistic Principle, the following hypothetical must be posed: If A contracts with
B for B to build him a ship for the price of one million dollars and
three years later (during which time annual inflation has run at ten
percent) the ship is delivered by B to A, what price does A then
owe to B? Every first year law student would answer one million
dollars, barring any further facts. This is an example of the application of the nominalistic principle, "a principle of the law of obligations which deals with the problem of the extent of a monetary
obligation." 1 The principle simply stated is that "a unit of currency
is always equal to itself.''2 Thus, regardless of the passage of time
and the risks of economic fluctuation appendant thereto, a monetary
price agreed to in a binding contract is the price due upon completion of performance by the other contracting party.
Mr. Hirschberg criticizes the general approval and application
which the nominalistic principle has received in the law of contracts
primarily on the premise that the law must recognize private rights
in money. First it is argued that the application of the nominalist
principle during severe inflationary times is certainly not in accord
with the intent of the parties to the contract. Mr. Hirschberg assumes that an equality of obligation existed between the contracting parties at the time the contract was made and that it was not the
intent of any of the contracting parties at that time to make a gift to
the other. Yet, during a period of rapid inflation, the application
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of the nominalistic principle to a medium or long term contract in
effect makes a gift to one of the contracting parties at the expense
of the other, since it fails to recognize the inflation and the resultant
decline in the purchasing power of the sum of money originally
agreed upon. This destroys the equilibrium of value given for
value received assumption which was presumptively the original intent of the parties to the contract. Consequently, Mr. Hirschberg
argues that this imposition of the nominalistic principle during periods of severe inflation and resultant declines in the purchasing
power of units of money causes an unjust enrichment of one party
to the contract to the impoverishment of the other party. This concept of unjust enrichment, though only briefly discussed in the text,
is the essential justification for the rejection of the nominalistic
principle.
Because of the inequitable results of the application of the nominalistic principle, Mr. Hirschberg rejects it and urges the adoption
of the principle of valorism during times of rapid and severe inflation. Essentially, valorism emphasizes the concept of the economic value of money rather than the absolute number of the units of
money. Thus, in a private contract scenario such as that posed previously, the valoristic principle would dictate that each party should
receive the full economic value of that for which he bargained, i.e.
the shipbuilder should receive a price from the buyer approximately
30% above that originally contracted for. Thus, the valoristic principle implicitly recognizes private rights in money by its recognition
of the decline in purchasing power of money which results from inflation and by its allotting to the parties the value for which they
originally bargained, rather than the nominal sum. The valoristic
approach is seen as essentially intent fulfilling in contrast to the intent defeating operation of the nominalistic principle.
The espousal of valorism in The Nominalistic Principle is not
doctrinaire and is tempered with the realization that such a principle
may be difficult to implement; some readers may view it as wellnigh impossible. The implementation of the valoristic principle
would require adequate standards by which to measure the increase
or the decrease in the economic value; it would require the determination of a threshold point at which the valoristic principle would
become applicable; and finally it would require a sophisticated judiciary capable of making complex economic judgments. Mr.
Hirschberg suggests that such standards and decision points can be
obtained through the development of arbitrary indices by indepen-
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It would appear to this reader, however, that

while precedent for such a method of implementation exists, the degree of economic deprivation required to motivate the adoption of
the valoristic principle is so great as to render the adoption and implementation of the valoristic principle only remotely possible at
this time.
It would appear that in the context of private obligations which
The Nominalistic Principle employs, the discussion of the relative
merits of nominalism versus valorism is in its essence a discussion
of who should bear the burden of the risk of severe inflation. Under a nominalistic approach, the party who provides goods or services bears the burden of the risk; while under the valoristic approach, the party providing the sum of money bears the burden of
the risk. The question is finally reduced to this: on which party is
it more just to place the burden of the risk of inflation and why?
The Nominalistic Principle in advocating valorism fails to answer
this question adequately; the author simply states that "From the
theoretical point of view it is more just that such risk be imposed
on the debtor than on the creditor."'
A second problem with Mr. Hirschberg's rejection of nominalism and espousal of valorism is his failure to recognize that in
a long term contract, the parties thereto are likely to know the risks
involved and assume them or make provision therefore. It is the
long term contract which is most adversely affected by the application of the nominalistic principle - but where the parties to such a
contract have recognized and provided for the risks involved, how
can it be said that it is unjust or intention defeating to apply the
nominalistic principle? In today's period of rising inflation, the
open price term contract is well known and is not uncommonly employed. The open price term contract by its very nature dictates
that the parties thereto have recognized the risks and have in effect
provided for their own valoristic principle. With such a valoristic
option readily available to contracting parties, can it be said that it
is unjust to retain nominalism - it seems not.
The final portion of The Nominalistic Principle treats the subject of revaluations, both legislative and judicial. Treating revaluations as essentially a compromise between valorism and nominalism, Mr. Hirschberg presents a concise and valuable analysis of the
theoretical and practical problems of revaluation.
While some readers more attuned to the practical rather than
3
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the theoretical may have difficulty following Mr. Hirschberg's analysis, The Nominalistic Principle is a scholarly work of significance,
especially in light of the times. While valorism, in contrast to nominalism, appears to be the exception rather than the general rule of
law, The Nominalistic Principle is most certainly of invaluable assistance in recognizing the problems inherent in the nominalistic
principle and the alternatives that valorism presents.
LAWRENCE EDWARD GAWELL
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